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RECENT DECISIONS
LABOR LAW - INJUNCTIONS - JURISDICTION OF N. L. R. B.
HELD EXCLUSIVE
In an action to restrain a labor union and an employer from discriminating
against plaintiff employees because of their non-membership in the union, and
to direct the union to either admit the plaintiffs to membership or waive a
union shop agreement, the Appellate Division reversed the lower court and
dismissed the complaint on the ground that exclusive jurisdiction in the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board precluded any action by a state court in a labor
dispute. Ryan v. Simons, 277 App. Div. 1000, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 18 (2d Dept.
1950).
The plaintiffs here worked on the loading platforms of the News Syndicate
Co. in New York City. They had been refused admission to the union (News-
paper and Mail Deliverers Union), although they were willing to join, because
the union was a closed union, admitting only sons of certain members. Union
insistence that the employer call all union" men for work by union seniority,
before calling any non-union men, regardless of their plant seniority, threat-
ened to deprive plaintiffs of their previous steady employment. The theory of
their action was that the union had breached its common law duty to fairly
represent all employees in the plant, both union and non-union.
The problem of admission to union membership where employment de-
pends on such membership has plagued the courts throughout the development
of modem labor law. All, jurisdictions have been unanimous in refusing to
compel unions to accept members regardless of the reason, or lack of reason,
for excluding them. Murphy v. Higgins, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 913, aff'd, 260 App.
Div. 854, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 555 (1st Dept. 1940); Miller v. Ruehl, 2 N. Y,.S. 2d
394 (Sup. Ct. 1938) ; Acierno v. North Shore Bus Co., 17 N. Y. S. 2d 170 (Sup.
Ct., 1939); Simons v. Berry, 210 App. Div. 90, 205 N. Y. Supp. 442 (1st Dept.
1924); Walterv. McCarvel, 309 Mass. 260, 34 N. E. 2d 677 (1941); see Sum-
MERs, The Right to join a Union, 47 COL. L. REv. 33 (1947). The rationale of
these decisions was a traditional notion that a union was a private, fraternal
organization, and that it held unlimited power to 'excude applicants for mem-
bership.
New York limited this doctrine with the passage of S 43 of the Civil Rights
Law, which provided that exclusion could not be on the grounds of race, creed,
color, or national origin. The case of Clark v. Curtis, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 55,
reversed, 273 App. Div. 797, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 3, aff'd, 297 N. Y. 1014, 80 N. E.
2d 536 (1948), alleviated some of the hardship of exclusions by holding that
a complaint which alleged that the union had violated its common law duty to
represent all of the employees stated a good cause of action for an injunction.
The Court of Appeals did not clearly indicate the basis of its holding, but the
refusal to dismiss was a tacit assertion that the courts would protect the right
of the employee to be fairly represented by his statutory agent, even though
it would not grant him the full privilege of membership in the union.
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The question of the jurisdiction of the court to grant this relief did not
arise in connection with an admission case until Costaro v. Simons, 277 App.
773, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 884 (2d Dept. 1950), reversing 94 N. Y. S. 2d 895. The
defendant employer in that action moved to dismiss th, complaint on the
ground that the court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter since exclusive
jurisdiction was vested in the N. L. R. B. The lower court held that it had
jurisdiction on the authority of Clark v. Curtis, supra, reasoning that inasmuch
as Clark v. Curtis had been decided by the C6tift of Appeals on May 21, 1948,
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) was presum-
ably considered by that court. Tfi Appellate Division did not discuss the
problem of jurisdiction but disfnigsdd the action on the theory that the plaintiffs
had not shown any diseriniifiation on the part of the employer.
The stage was thus set for Ryan v. Simons, the principal case. The Supreme
&tlit for Nassau County refused a motion to dismiss the complaint referring
io6 ldtk v. Curtis, supra, and granted an injunction pendente lite restraining
&ie d6f6fdants employer and union from interfering with plaintiff's employ-
miit. -25 L. R. R. M. 2302 (1950)." It is important to note that the relief
souiit; the preservation of existing employment, had been granted without
ifiii-ipion of that employment, and if found to be justified on hearing, would
6lviai6 iti armful results of discrimination.
Wieii i~h6 kyah case came on for final hearing, Justice Hooley, in the New
York Supreffi6 -6ii-t, 98 N. Y. S. 2d 243, 26 L. R. R. M. 2047 (1950), brought
th6 full-fledgS6 dbctrine of fair representation to New York. The decision
poihted out t h.t ii was not a "labor dispute" under New York statutes. Civil
Practice Act, § 876-a. (See also N. Y. Lab. Rel. Act, § 704). The theory of
the action was that the common law principles of agency were to be applied to
the union as the statutory representative of these employees. Steele v. Louis-
ville & Nashville R. R., 323 U. S. 192 (1944) ; Betts v. Easley, 161 Kans. 459,
169 P. 2d 831 (1946. The rule of law was stated to be: "Where a union is
designated as a bargaining agent of all the employees and accepts the principle
of the union shop and incorporates such principle into a contract which pro-
vike% hai all noi-union men must join the union within thirty days, then such
provisions of th6 contract relating to the union shop are illegal, invalid and void
in a case such as !his, where the union refuses to admit such non-members
wilhbut just caui6 and discriminates Against such employees because of non-
membership in !he union."
The court went on to say that the contention of the defendants that the
plaintiffs' only remedy falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the N. L. R. B.
could not be sustained under Clark v. Curtis, and that the effect of the Taft-
Hartley Act had been urged upon the Court of Appeals in the defendants'
briefs in the Clark case. As noted, the Appellate Division reversed this de-
cigion and dismissed the complaint, cutting short the development of a state
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remedy for interference with employment by a labor union, with the terse
statement that the court had no power to act. The decision brushed aside the
holding in Clark v. Curtis as not controlling in this situation.
The basic problem here, of course, is the matter of federal supremacy in
the field of labor law. This case presents a particular phase of the problem in
the form of the immediate, pressing predicament of a non-union employee
who seeks only to maintain his employment uninterruptedly in the face of
discrimination. Without a relatively quick remedy in the courts of his own
state, will he find a timely, adequate remedy elsewhere? The decisions of the
N. L. R. B. and the Supreme Court on the supremacy problem have not dealt
with this specific question. If the question is presented, there are three
possible views that may be taken. It may be decided that the Board has juris-
diction of the subject matter and that it must provide a remedy. See Rockaway
News Supply Co., N. L. R. B. Release, Nov. 1, 1950, p. 6 (trial examiner's
recommendation that union here involved and a different employer cease and
desist from the practices here complained of). It may conceivably be decided
that it has jurisdiction which, however, should not be exercised in this type of
case because of the lack of national significance. Retail Clerks International
Ass'n, (A-I Photo Serice), 83 N. L. R. B_ 564 (1949); Fred Montgomery,
d.b.a. Pereira Studio, 83 N. L. R. B. 587 (1949). The third possibility is that
there may be a denial of jurisdiction and a subsequent compulsion upon the
complainant to seek his remedy at the state level. Under the N. L. R. A., as
amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, any one of the three ptossibilities could
result. The question then presented is whether the state court is justified in
holding that it had no jurisdiction in the absence of a judicial or administrative
holding, or a regulation of the Board asserting that it has jurisdiction, or that,
if it has jurisdiction, it is not to be exercised in this situaton.
A partial answer may be found in the reasoning employed by the court
in the instant case. It held that this was clearly a "labor dispute" within the
purview of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)
(3) and 158(b) (2), and that, therefore, exclusive jurisdiction was in the
Board. The conclusion that this is a "labor. dispute" within the meaning of the
Act is not an unreasonable one under the wording of the cited sections. The
further conclusion concerning exclusive jurisdiction, however, raising prob-
lems of a more serious nature.
Is the policy of the Act such that it must preclude state action concerning
the relations between the individual employee and his union representative?
Did the Congress consider this situation as one "affecting" interstate com-
merce to the extent that it required, uniform federal regulation and sanction?
Did the Congress consider the question at all? Was it cognizant of the pro-
gress being made in the states under the common law principles and state
statutes to protect the right of freedom from discrimintion in the field of em-
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ployment? How does this decision affect the power of the New York court to
hear a labor case involving discrimination on one of the grounds stated in 5 43
of the N. Y. Civil Rights Act? Are we faced with the anomaly wherein a man
who has been denied union membership, and consequently the right to work
because of race, creed, color, or national origin may seek relief in the state
courts, while the man who has suffered the same wrongs because he is not the
son of a deceased member of the union must seek his remedy at the federal
level?
The Appellate Division found its answer in the cases of Amazon Cottin
Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 167 F. 2d 183 (4th Cir. 1948), and California
Ass'n. of Employers v. Building and Construction Trades Council, 178 F. 2d
175 (9th Cir. 1949). It is submitted, however, that these cases merely hold
that administrative remedies on the federal level must be exhausted before
recourse is made to the federal courts. The Appellate Division has apparently
confused a question of the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency
with a Constitutional question of federal supremacy.
The basic question as to whether the federal government has pre-empted
the entire field of labor relations and has thereby removed all common law or
statutory power previously reserved to the state over the identical subject
matter has led to divergent lines of reasoning in judicial decisions. The prob-
lem is essentially one of legislative policy. Ideally, the Congress should draw
the lines delimiting jurisdiction or the Board should od so under the rule-
making authority granted it by § 6, N. L. R. A. In the absence of a clear ex-
pression of Congressional intent or administrative policy, the Supreme Court
has attempted to reach workable solutions: 'in the field of representation prob-
lems, Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U. S.
767 (1947), La Crosse Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,'336
-.- S. 18 (1949); in the field of employer labor practices, Algoma Plywood &
Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U. S. 301 (1949),
Plankington Pcking Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 338 U. S. 953
(1950), Missouri- Pacific R. R. v. Porter, 273 U. S. 341 (1927) ; in the' field of
concerted labor activities, International Union v. Wisconsin Emplovment Re.
lations Bd., 336 U. S. 245 (1949), Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538 (1945), United
Auto Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U. S. 454 (1950). For an excellent discusslott
of the above fields of regulation and the problems raised by the courts' de-
cisions, see Cox and Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 65 HARV. L.
REV. 211 (1950).
Electric Ry. Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 71 S. Ct.
359 (Feb. 26, 1951), sets out the most recent development of the strict and the
liberal views on the federal supremacy question as regards the subject of con-
certed labor activities. The majority opinion adheres-to the strict view that
the entrance of the federal government occupies the field to the exclusion of
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state regulation. (See particulary Footnote 12 of the court's opinion). Jus-
tice Frankfurter, in a strong dissent, favored the more liberal view that the
states are not precluded from enacting and enforcing laws on labor relations
merely because Congress has entered the field. "It is equally clear," he stated,
"that the boundaries within which a state may act are determined by the terrain
and not by abstract projection." 71 S. Ct. at 370.
It is submitted that the Ryan case presents a less complex problem of less
"national significance" than any case thus far before the Supreme Court, and
one in which "conflict" between state and federal regulation is very remote.
The "terrain" suggests that this is a proper case for local jurisdiction and
should not be added to the already burdensome schedule of the N(L. R. B. by
reason of the refusal of the state courts to act.
Francis W. Greune.
